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Methodological Separatism, Modal Pluralism and Metaphysical Nihilism 
 
David Efird and Tom Stoneham 
 
In this paper, we aim to clarify the debate over the particular question of whether there 
might have been nothing, and the more general question of the nature of modality, by 
introducing the concept of a Modal Theory and investigating its form. We begin by 
arguing that the question of whether there might have been nothing can be pursued 
independently of the question of the nature of possible worlds; that is, we can 
investigate what possibilities there are without having to investigate what possibilities 
are. A WKHRU\WKDWJRYHUQVZKDWSRVVLELOLWLHVWKHUHDUHZHFDOOµDModal Theory¶ We 
then draw attention to the fact that modal theorists, to date, have typically assumed 
that modal theories are single-criterion, that is, that they have the form: p iff ¸q for 
non-disjunctive p.1 In response, we challenge the reasons we take for this assumption, 
and then present an argument for Modal Theory having multiple-criteria, a view we 
GXE µPRGDO SOXUDOLVP¶ We then investigate the forms of the axioms of such a 
multiple-criteria Modal Theory, and we conclude by drawing lessons for the debate 
over whether there might have been nothing. 
 
1. Methodological Separatism 
 
In earlier work (2005a, 2005b, 2006, and 2008), we have insisted on the distinctness of 
two philosophical questions one might ask about modality and, more importantly, on 
the methodological separability of the projects of answering each question.2 In this 
section we further articulate this methodological thesis and defend it against a recent 
criticism by John Divers (forthcoming). 
 
The two questions relate, respectively, to the extent of possibility, what possibilities 
there are²that is, what is possible²and the nature of (unactualized) possibility, what 
(unactualized) possibilities are²that is, what possibility is. Clearly the questions are 
logically distinct, so the substantive issue is whether the philosophical project of 
answering each is distinct or whether they can only be addressed together. Of course, 
one does not have a fully adequate philosophy of modality unless one has answered 
both questions, so, in a sense, they are parts of a single project, but, even so, it leaves 
open the issue of whether we should answer one question, at least in part, by 
answering the other; specifically, whether our account of the nature of possibility 
should partially determine the answer to the question of what is possible, or whether 
we should address them separately, though under the over-arching constraint that our 
answers be mutually consistent. 
                                                        
1
 +HUHDQG WKURXJKRXWZHXVH µp¶DQG µq¶DVVFKHPDWLF OHWWHUV IRUZHOO-formed formulae or 
grammatical sentences without any presumption that they are logically simple, excepting, of 
course, in the definition of a single-FULWHULRQWKHRU\DVRQHIRUZKLFKµp¶LVQRWDGLVMXQFWLRQ 
2
 We are not alone in this view, for methodological separatism is exploited in Cameron 2012 
and encouraged in Gregory 2011. 
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It seems that there are four possible views about the relation between these two 
questions. $ µQDWXUH ILUVW¶ WKHRULVW ZRXOG KROG WKDW ZH PXVW DQVZHU WKH TXHVWLRQ RI
what unactualised possibilities are first and that the answer to that question should 
constrain our answer to the question of extent. Perhaps Quine exemplifies this attitude, 
for he seems to think ontological scruples about possible fat men in the doorway 
should lead us to restrict what possibilities we allow (1953: 4). ,QFRQWUDVWDQµH[WHQW
ILUVW¶ WKHRULVW ZRXOG KROG WKDW ZH EHJLQ E\ ZRUNLQJ RXW ZKDW LV SRVVLEOH and then 
populate the world with possibilia to match. 4XLQH¶Vµ:\PDQ¶ZKRLVDFORVHUHODWLYH
of Meinong, has this view. 7KLUGO\ZHPLJKWVHHNDµUHIOHFWLYHHTXLOLEULXP¶EHWZHHQ
our answers to the two questions, sometimes rejecting a claim about what is possible 
on the grounds of nature and sometimes doing the reverse. We suspect that this 
approach is in fact the one taken by most metaphysicians. We want to defend the 
IRXUWK RSWLRQ GXEEHG µVHSDUDWLVP¶ While this may have very similar results to the 
third option, there are great benefits in dialectical clarity. According to the separatist, 
there is one project of determining the best answer to the question of extent and 
another project of determining the best answer to the question of nature. And a third 
project of coming up with a consistent set of overall philosophical views. The first two 
projects are part of the public academic activity of philosophy. The third is a more 
personal matter: what is an appealing trade off between ontology and ideology for one 
philosopher may be unacceptable to another. Some have a taste for desert landscapes, 
others for bio-diversity. By confusing matters of the objective evaluation of theories 
with more subjective questions of what overall package of views someone can be 
brought to accept, metaphysics does itself a disservice conducted in the sphere of 
public reason. The separatist merely points out that by maintaining consistency with 
some other views, a philosopher may be accepting a much worse answer to the 
question of extent or nature or... There is no such thing as a free lunch, but someone 
needs to calculate the bill. 
  
In our earlier work, we have described answers to the two questions about modality as 
µWKHRULHV¶DQG WKHGDWDZKLFK WKH\GUDZXSRQDV µLQWXLWLRQV¶ For these purposes, we 
can regard any assertion or belief which organizes some data, usually by categorizing 
it or deriving it from some variables, as theoretical with respect to that data (which 
may, in turn, be theoretical with respect to some other data). In this sense, any 
philosophical account of X is a theory of X. Thus, traditional philosophical analyses, 
such as the tri-partite account of knowledge, are theories (in this case, asserting that 
knowledge is a function of three variables²and the majority of responses to the 
Gettier counter-H[DPSOHVFDQEHVHHQDVDWWHPSWLQJWRILQGDIRXUWKµKLGGHQ¶YDULDEOH
as are ontological reductions, such as the bundle theory of objects. 
  
While any theory is theoretical only relative to some data, and thus some data are only 
data relative to some theory, we may reasonably think that there must be some data 
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which are not theoretical relative to anything, on pain of regress.3 These data are the 
ultimate subject matter for all theorizing and must include empirical data, such as 
observation and experience. But philosophical theorizing also draws upon other data, 
DQGWKDWLVZKDWZHKDYHLQGLFDWHGZLWKWKHWHUPµLQWXLWLRQV¶ The nature of these data 
is highly controversial (see Williamson 2007 for a lengthy discussion), with some 
taking them to be concepts or conceptual schemes, others linguistic knowledge, others 
a priori knowledge. :HLQWHQGWRUHPDLQQHXWUDORQWKHVHLVVXHVXVLQJµLQWXLWLRQV¶WR
refer to that body of beliefs about a subject matter upon which we can reach general, 
though rarely universal, agreement prior to philosophical theorizing. Determining 
exactly what falls into the class of intuitions is not easy, and we do not rule out the 
relevance of experimental philosophy (Alexander 2012), but nor do we think that pre-
philosophical beliefs about X need to be unreflective beliefs about X, and thus we 
allow that on reflection there may be agreement on a belief which is different from that 
held by the majority prior to reflection (which is just to say that by µDJUHHPHQW¶ZH
mean the product of a process of discussion rather than the summing of a set of 
independent opinions).4 And because the process of agreement is reflective, it can also 
involve ensuring consistency with our knowledge in general, and especially our 
scientific knowledge. 
  
With these definitions in hand, we can state the thesis of methodological separatism a 
little more clearly. The data for the theory of the extent of possibility, of what is 
possible, are intuitions about what is possible, intuitions about propositions of the form 
µ¸p¶ ZKHUHDQ LQWXLWLRQDERXWDSURSRVLWLRQFDQEH WKDW LW LV WUXHRU WKDW LW LV IDOVH5 
Since the theory aims to establish the extent of what is possible, it will consist of a 
VHULHV RI SURSRVLWLRQV RI WKH IRUP µLI p then ¸q¶ DQG SHUKDSV DOVR µLI p then ~¸q¶
though see below for discussion of this point). There is no reason to restrict p to non-
modal propositions, and, in fact, if we want some of the axioms of modal logics such 
as S4 to be part of this theory, then we will have to allow modal antecedents. 
  
Strictly speaking, the data for the theory of the nature of (unactualized) possibility are 
just intuitions about what kind of thing (unactualized) possibilities are.6 These are 
VSDUVH WKRXJKWKHIDPRXVµLQFUHGXORXVVWDUH¶ZKLFK/HZLV¶V*HQXLQH0RGDOUealism 
so often met (Lewis 1986: 133) suggests there are some implicit beliefs about these 
matters, and Peter van Inwagen has aUWLFXODWHG D VSHFLILF LQWXLWLRQ WKXV µ+RZcould 
one suppose that the (unactualized) possibility that the universe is thus-and-so is a 
                                                        
3
 Which is not to say that the data may not be theory-laden, merely that it is itself not 
theoretical in the sense defined above. 
4
 $ EHWWHU WHUP WKDQ µLQWXLWLRQ¶ DQG RQH ZKLFK OLQNV WKe thought to its history, might be 
µFRPPRQQRWLRQV¶ 
5
 Strictly speaking, this rests upon a prior philosophical theory, the duality of the modal 
operators, which takes as its data all modalized intuitions. 
6
 Intuitions about what properties possibilities have, including such properties as being 
knowable, can be included here because they have consequences for what kinds of thing 
those possibilities are. 
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thing that has a mass of 3.4 x 1057 grams and is UDSLGO\H[SDQGLQJ"¶ 226). 
However, we can also include in the data for this theory intuitions about what sorts of 
thing there are or are not which have consequences about what unactualized 
possibilities are, even if those consequences need careful drawing out (see e.g. the 
discussion of the null individual in our 2005b). While that exhausts the data proper to 
the theory, it is a general feature of a theory of the nature of Xs that it may have 
consequences for which Xs exist, if any. Furthermore, that may be one of the primary 
interests in constructing such a theory. This might lead one to think that intuitions 
about which Xs exist, in this case the intuitions which are the data for the theory of the 
extent of possibility, are data for the theory of the nature of Xs. However, the 
methodological separatist denies this, insisting instead that the only data for the theory 
of the nature of possibility are intuitions about the nature of unactualized possibilities 
and that intuitions about what is possible do not directly constrain that theory. They do, 
however, indirectly constrain the theory via the requirement that all our theories be 
mutually consistent and, consequently, that the theory of the nature of possibility be 
consistent with the theory of the extent of possibility. If the former has a consequence 
which is inconsistent with the latter, one or the other will have to be modified. 
  
We have pursued the separatist methodology through a series of papers on 
metaphysical nihilism, which is the claim that there might have been nothing concrete. 
To begin, we (2005a) argued for this claim on the basis of a theoretical claim in the 
theory of the extent of possibility, namely, that all contingent concreta possess the 
modal property of subtractability,7 which was itself grounded in intuitions about what 
is possible. Then, we (2005b, 2006) argued that, despite claims to the contrary, 
PHWDSK\VLFDO QLKLOLVP LV LQ IDFW FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK UHVSHFWLYHO\ /HZLV¶V  DQG
$UPVWURQJ¶V 1989) theories of the nature of unactualized possibility. Finally, we 
(200DUJXHG WKDW WKHSOHQLWXGHREMHFWLRQ WR/HZLV¶V  WKHRU\RI WKHQDWXUHRI
unactualized possibility misconstrues the role of the Principle of Recombination, 
which is, in fact, part of the theory of the extent of possibility and not a proper part of 
LHZLV¶VWKHRU\RIWKHQDWXUHRIXQDFWXDOL]HGSRVVLELOLW\ 
  
However, John Divers (forthcoming) has recently launched an important challenge to 
methodological separatism. He notes that separatism has consequences for what is and 
is not relevant to evaluating the success of a theory8 RIPRGDOLW\VXFKDV/HZLV¶VEXW
that evaluation of a theory is only possible once we have fully defined our conception 
RIDQDO\VLVZKLFKLQYROYHVVSHFLILFDWLRQRIµLWVLQWHQGHGFRPSRQHQWVVWUXFWXUHDLPV
methods and criteria RI VXFFHVV¶ (1). Divers then presents a clear specification of 
/HZLV¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI DQDO\VLV DQG DUJXHV WKDW RQ WKLV FRQFHSWLRQ PHWKRGRORJLFDO
separatism is mistaken. As he is well aware, this does not show that methodological 
separatism is, in fact, mistaken, for the result is only conditional, but it does pose a 
                                                        
7
 This way of putting the point was intended to head off the objection to the argument in 
Lowe (this volume). 
8
 'LYHUVRQO\WDONVRIµDQDO\VLV¶EXWWKDWLVDW\SHRIWKHRU\RQRXUGHILQLWLRQ 
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significant challenge to the separatist to offer an equally well-defined conception of 
her philosophical project which does not have the same consequence. 
 According to Divers, on the Lewisian conception, an analysis consists of three 
components: <Opinion, Analytic Hypotheses, Metaphysical Base>. Opinion is pre-
philosophical belief, which includes and may be identical with the sum of all intuitions, 
as defined above. The Analytic HypotheseVJLYHDµVHQVH¶RUµWUXWK-FRQGLWLRQ¶IRU
the subset of Opinion, which is the target of the analysis, typically in the form of a bi-
conditional, and the Metaphysical Base is an existential statement, which, given the 
Analytic Hypotheses, determines the truth-values of the target sentences and, quite 
possibly, other sentences in the Opinion. Thus, in the case of the analysis of modality, 
we get the following (4): 
 
(Opinion)    It is possible that there be [Fs, e.g.] talking donkeys 
(Analytic Hypothesis) It is an F-possibility iff there unrestrictedly exists an F* 
(Metaphysical Base)   There (unrestrictedly) exist x, y .... such that .... H*x, y ...  
 
where H* is a primitive expression of the kind that figures at the end of a chain of 
Definitions of the arbitrary non-modal predicate F*.  
  
Such an analysis is evaluated against the dual virtues of Conservativeness (of Opinion) 
and Economy (of Metaphysical Base) in the following manner (10): we hold the 
Analytic Hypotheses constant and consider the various pairings of Opinion and 
Metaphysical Base which result from their co-variation established in the Analytic 
Hypotheses. If some such pairing is adequate with respect to both Conservativeness 
and Economy, then the analysis is accepted, but if none is, the analysis is rejected. 
  
Since Opinion includes beliefs about what is and is not possible, beliefs which have a 
direct bearing on the extent of possibility, considerations of Economy in the 
Metaphysical Base have direct consequences for the extent of possibility. Thus, to take 
a well-known example, Opinion includes, or at least is committed to, the possibility of 
µLVODQGXQLYHUVHV¶WKDWLVSRVVLEOHXQLYHUVHVZLWKVSDWLR-temporally unconnected parts. 
But the Analytic Hypothesis requires that all possibilities are parts of worlds and the 
Metaphysical Base tells us that worlds are maximally spatio-temporally interconnected 
mereological sums. Thus, Lewis (1986: 71) is faced with the choice of modifying the 
Metaphysical Base or rejecting an aspect of Opinion, and he takes the latter course. 
This seems a clear violation of methodological separatism, justified by the conception 
of analysis. 
  
Divers¶ FKDOOHQJH WR WKH VHSDUDWLVW LV WR JLYH DQ HTXDOO\ ZHOO-defined and clear 
conception of analysis which does not have this consequence. Given what was said 
above, the separatist could perfectly well adopt the Lewisian conception of analysis as 
DQDFFRXQWRIWKHWKHRU\RIWKHQDWXUHRI;ZLWKRQHFKDQJHQDPHO\WKDWµ2SLQLRQ¶
be restricted to intuitions about the nature of X or about what kind of thing there is or 
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is not, that is, to proper data for the theory. 9  This move immediately blocks the 
FRQVHTXHQFH WKDW WKH HYDOXDWLRQ RI DQ DQDO\VLV VXFK DV /HZLV¶V LQYROYHV PDNLQJ D
judgement about the extent of possibility. In fact, we can grant that intuitions about 
what unactualized possibilities are is entirely neutral on the question of island 
universes and thus that the saving in Economy provided by a Metaphysical Base in 
which all worlds are maximally spatio-temporally interconnected mereological sums 
has no cost to Conservativeness at all. However, given the Analytic Hypotheses, it 
does entail that island universes are not possible. But even if we grant that intuition 
about what is possible includes island universes, we do not yet have a loss of 
Conservativeness, for we do not know whether the best theory of the extent of 
possibility captures or rejects that intuition. Suppose Modal Theory does capture that 
intuition. Then our best theory of the extent of possibility LVLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWK/HZLV¶V
theory of the nature of unactualized possibility, and we have a hard theory choice to 
make, comparing not merely the virtues of each theory but also those of the next best 
theory. Suppose, instead, that Modal Theory does not capture the intuition. Then, in 
our overall account of modality, there is a loss of Conservativeness. But, crucially, this 
is held against Modal Theory, the theory of what is possible, not the Lewisian theory 
of what possibilities are. So, should there be some inconsistency discovered with some 
third theory, we can properly evaluate which part of our overall account of modality 
has that particular weakness.10 
  
However, this is not an adequate separatist response to Divers¶FKDOOHQJHIRUWKHUHLV
as yet no well-defined conception of the components, structure, aims, methods and 
criteria of success for a separate theory of the extent of possibility. Without such a 
conception, it remains open that the only adequate way to address the question of 
extent is by an analysis of the nature of possibility and its consequences for the extent 
of possibility. 
  
From what was said above, an account of the extent of possibility, of what is possible, 
appears to have two parts corresponding, respectively, to data and to theory, namely 
<Intuition, Principles>. 7KHLQWXLWLRQVZLOOEHWKRVHDERXWSURSRVLWLRQVRIWKHIRUPµ¸p¶ 
7KHSULQFLSOHVZLOO EH FRQGLWLRQDOVRI WKH IRUP µLI p then ¸q¶ DQGSHUKDSV DOVR µLI p 
then ~¸q¶ In order to count as a theory of the intuitive data, the principles must non-
WULYLDOO\ HQWDLO WKDW GDWD LH QRW EHFDXVH WKH\ KDYH WKH IRUP µLI ¸p then ¸p¶ 
Furthermore, the theory is interesting or useful or explanatory in virtue of having 
principles which each generate significant numbers of data points.  
                                                        
9
 Is the intuition that island universes are possible an intuition about the nature of 
unactualized possibility? Well, it is an oddity of the Lewisian metaphysics that unactualized 
possibilities have the properties that are said to be possible, so every claim about what is 
possible entails a claim about the nature of an unactualized possibility. But since that 
entailment is mediated by the very theory we are evaluating, the consequence cannot be 
regarded as data for the theory. 
10
 This paragraph is a more abstract version of the argument at Efird & Stoneham (2008: 
484). 
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However, in order for the principles to generate any possibilities at all, we need a third 
element in the theory, corresponding structurally to the Metaphysical Base. Now, if 
there are a small number of principles with a limited variety of antecedents, then this 
third element can be quite small, but we cannot know that in advance. So, it is best if 
the third element contains all the antecedents of all the possible Principles. Since we 
DUH RQO\ LQWHUHVWHG LQ WUXH DQWHFHGHQWV OHW¶V FDOO WKLV µ)DFW¶ Fact includes all of 
Intuition and all consequences of the conjunction of Fact and Principle, for the 
antecedents of Principles can be modal. So we have the following structure: <Intuition, 
Principles, Fact>. Which we can spell out schematically: 
 
Intuitions: ¸p1, ¸p2«¸pn 
Principles:  if p*i then ¸pj 
Facts:  p*1, p*2«p*m 
 
The Principles are not analytic, for their consequents contain information not in their 
antecedents. Rather, they are meant to explain the Intuitions (in conjunction with the 
Facts). So how do we evaluate such a theory? There seem to be four criteria of 
evaluation: 
 
1. Consistency 
If Intuition contains ~¸q and Facts contains p and Principles contains LI S WKHQ ¸T, 
revision of something is required. It might be thought that Facts will never be subject 
to revision on the basis of conflict with modal Intuitions and Principles, but (i) Facts 
include modal propositions, and (ii) Facts may include analyses of what unactualized 
possibilities are, so they do not have any clear priority over the other two elements. 
 
2. Fit to data 
If we have two theories which are both consistent, we can evaluate their relative merits 
by considering which has a better fit to the data, that is, which captures more of the 
Intuitions. However, if the Principles only generate possibilities, that is, propositions 
RI WKH IRUP µ¸p¶ VHH EHORZ IRU GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKLV LVVXH ZH QHHG WR WDNH FDUH WR
distinguish between a theory which fails to fit the Intuition that ~¸p by generating ¸p, 
and one which fails to fit the Intuition that ¸p by failing to generate ¸p. In the former 
case, this is clearly a theoretical vice, but the latter case may not be such unless we 
know independently that the theory is complete. If we allow the possibility of multiple 
Principles, we may be able to rectify the latter failure to fit the data by adding more 
Principles. As we see in the next section, many philosophers seem to assume that there 
can only be one Principle generating possibilities. 
 
3. Simplicity 
If we have two theories which are both consistent, we can evaluate their merits by how 
well they organize the data. Simplicity is very hard to make precise, but it is a widely 
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accepted theoretical virtue in many fields, so the issue of assessing it is a general 
problem in the account of theory choice and not one specific to this area. 
 
4. Power 
If we have two theories which are both consistent and roughly equal in their balance of 
fit to data and simplicity, then we can evaluate their merits by their ability to 
extrapolate or interpolate new data points. For example, suppose Intuition is silent on 
whether talking fleas are possible or not. If theory A has the consequence that talking 
fleas are possible (or not) but theory B has no such consequence, then²ceteris 
paribus²we have a reason to prefer theory A over B in virtue of its being more 
powerful. 
 
Clearly more detail can be given, but from this sketch, it should be clear that there can 
be a well-defined conception of the separate account of the extent of possibility, so 
'LYHUV¶FKDOOHQJHLVPHW 
 
2. Single-Criterion Modal Theories Against Metaphysical Nihilism 
 
Michael Dummett (1959:  SRVHV WKH µSKLORVRSKLFDO SUREOHP¶ RI QHFHVVLW\ WKXV
µZKDW LV LWV VRXUFH DQG KRZ GR ZH UHFRJQLVH LW"¶ Posing the problem in this way 
presupposes that modal claLPVLIWUXHDUHQRWµEDUHO\WUXH¶LQWHUPLQRORJ\'XPPHWW
(1991: 328) develops later, that is, they are true in virtue of some other class or classes 
of statements. Whether modal claims are true in virtue of a single class of statements 
or multiple classes of statements has, to date, not been investigated. It has simply been 
DVVXPHG WKDW IROORZLQJ D FHUWDLQ UHDGLQJ RI 'XPPHWW¶V SRVLQJ RI WKH SKLORVRSKLFDO
problem of necessity, necessity has a single source rather than multiple sources. 
Through investigating the nature of Modal Theory, we aim to go some way towards 
opening up space for necessity having multiple sources as opposed to a single source.  
  
A Modal Theory is a theory which tells us which propositions are and which are not 
possible. Such a theory has the form 
 
(P) ¸p LII« 
 
where a single-criterion Modal Theory fills in the ellipsis in (P) with just one clause, 
while a multiple-criterion Modal Theory fills in the ellipsis with a disjunction of 
clauses. That is, the single-FULWHULRQWKHRU\KDVRQH3ULQFLSOHRIWKHIRUPµLIp then ¸q¶
whereas the multiple-criterion theory has several such Principles. According to a 
single-criterion Modal Theory, there is only one way for a proposition to be 
determined possible; according to a multiple-criterion Modal Theory, there are 
multiple ways for a proposition to be determined possible. That Modal Theory is, or 
should be, single-criterion is typically assumed in arguments of the form: state of 
affairs S does not meet criterion C, so p, the proposition describing S, is not possible. 
For this argument to be valid, it must be that criterion C gives the only criterion for a 
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proposition describing a state of affairs to be possible. Thus, the argument relies on 
Modal Theory being single-criterion. But this assumption has not been articulated, let 
alone defended. In what follows, we draw attention to this unarticulated and 
undefended assumption and the role it plays in two recent arguments against the 
possibility of nothing.11 
  
One of the most prominent single-criterion modal theories is 
 
(Con) <p> is possible iff it is conceivable that p. 
 
Such a theory is described by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne thus: 
 
We have, it seems, a capacity that enables us to represent scenarios to 
ourselves using words or concepts or sensory images, scenarios that 
purport to involve actual or non-actual things in actual or non-actual 
configurations. There is a natural way of using the tHUPµFRQFHLYH¶WKDW
refers to this activity in its broadest sense. When we engage in such 
conceivings, the things we depict to ourselves frequently present 
themselves as possible, and we have an associated tendency to judge 
that they are possible. Indeed, when invited to consider whether 
something is possible, we often engage in a deliberate effort to 
conceive of it; upon finding ourselves able to do so, we conclude that 
it is. We may even decide that something is impossible on the basis of 
our inability to conceive of it. (2002: 1-2; emphasis in the original) 
 
As an illustration of this Modal Theory at work, John Campbell (2002) seems to 
DVVXPH VRPHWKLQJ LW LQ KLV LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI %HUNHOH\¶V WKRXJKW ZKHQ KH FRQVLGHUV
%HUNHOH\¶VVR-called µPDVWHUDUJXPHQW¶*DOORLV 55): 
 
But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for 
instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to 
                                                        
11
 This assumption, that Modal Theory has, or should have, a single-criterion is made 
throughout much of the literature on Modal Theory and not merely in the dialectic 
concerning the possibility of nothing. As a further example, George Darby and Duncan 
WatsRQFULWLFLVHRXUIRUPXODWLRQRI/HZLV¶VSULQFLSOHRI UHFRPELQDWLRQ
RQWKHJURXQGVWKDWLWµGRHVQ¶WHQWDLOWKDWWKHUH¶VDZRUOGDWZKLFKWKHUH¶VQRJXQN¶+RZHYHU
nowhere do we assume that the principle of recombination is the only principle by which 
SRVVLELOLWLHVWKDWLVSRVVLEOHZRUOGVRQ/HZLV¶VYLHZDUHJHQHUDWHG2QWKHFRQWUDU\
we were well aware that, following Divers and Melia (2002), the principle of recombination 
does not deliver possibilities regarding alien individuals and properties, but if, as Divers and 
0HOLDDUJXHWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWµ>H@YHU\ZD\WKDWDSDUWRI>D@ZRUOGFRXOGEHLVD
ZD\WKDWDSDUWRIVRPHZRUOGLV¶WKHVHSRVVLELOLWLHVDUHLQGHHGJHQHUDWHGEXWDWWKHFRVWRI
XQGHUFXWWLQJ /HZLV¶V  UHGXFWLRQLVW DPELWLRQV 'DUE\ DQG :DWVRQ¶V FULWLFLVP WKXV
assumes a single-criterion Modal Theory, an assumption they never articulate and so never 
defend. 
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perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but 
what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain 
ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to 
frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you 
your self perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is 
nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining 
or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew that you can 
conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the 
mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing 
unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy 
(Berkeley 1710/1975: §23) 
 
Campbell (2002: ZULWHVµ%HUNHOH\IDPRXVO\FODLPHGWREHXQDEOHWR
conceive of existence unperceived, from which he famously concluded 
WKDW H[LVWHQFH XQSHUFHLYHG LV LPSRVVLEOH¶ Similarly, in commenting on 
WKH YHUVLRQ RI %HUNHOH\¶V  µPDVWHU DUJXPHQW¶ LQ WKH
Dialogues, André Gallois seems to read this same single-criterion Modal 
Theory LQ %HUNHOH\¶V WKRXJKW ZKHQ KH LQWHUSUHWV %HUNHOH\¶V DUJXPHQW
thus:12 
 
(1) Hylas thinks that possibly (x)(x is perceivable and x is 
unperceived). 
(2) If what Hylas thinks is true, then the concepts being the possible 
object of some perception and being the object of some perception 
do not necessarily apply to the very same things. 
(3) In order to sustain the claim that something could be both 
perceivable and unperceived, it must be possible to have an image 
of a perceivable which is not an image of something perceived. 
 
([3] follows from [2] in conjunction with an imagistic criterion of 
necessity, the demand that Hylas be in a position to mention the kind 
of thing that could be both perceivable and unperceived, and finally, 
that he can image appropriately something of this kind if he is to 
qualify as having the concept of an unperceived perceivable.) 
 
(4) Hylas cannot meet the condition embodied in (3) and his 
failure in this respect is not the result a contingent limitation 
RI+\ODV¶VSRZHUVRILPDJLQJ 
 
                                                        
12
 +RZHYHU*DOORLV¶UHDGLQJRI%HUNHOH\¶VDUJXPHQWDSSHDUVWREHDPLVUHDGLQJDV%HUNHOH\
endorses explicitly only the claim that if it is conceivable that there are unperceived things, 
then it is possible that there are unperceived things. See Stoneham 2002: 134-9 for details. 
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The desired conclusion that nothing could be both perceivable and 
unperceived follows (1974, 63-4). 
 
What underwrites botK &DPSEHOO¶V %HUNHOH\¶V LQIHUHQFH DQG *DOORLV¶ %HUNHOH\¶V
argument is the left-to-right direction of (Con), and the assumption that possibility is 
uniquely constituted by conceivability, a single-criterion Modal Theory. Now, Bede 
Rundle seems to be making just this sort of argument when he argues against the 
possibility of nothing thus: 
 
We might insist that it is not possible that there should be, or have been, 
nothing at all; whether animate or inanimate, material or immaterial, 
there had to be something. On the other hand, it may well be that of no 
particular thing can one say that it is inconceivable that it should not 
have existed; our galaxy did not have to exist, nor did galaxies quite 
generally. (2004: 110) 
 
In this passage, Rundle seems to take impossibility to be interchangeable with 
inconceivability, and, as a consequence, thereby endorse, at least implicitly the single-
criterion Modal Theory (Con). This comes out more clearly in the following argument 
against the possibility of nothing, where, on the assumption that we are unable to 
imagine nothing, it follows that there had to have been something, at least a setting: 
 
...I suspect that our attempts at conceiving of total non-existence are 
irredeemably partial. We are always left with something, if only a 
setting from which we envisage everything having departed, a void 
which we confront and find empty, but something which it makes sense 
to speak of as having once been home to bodies, radiation, or 
whatever... [T]alk of imagining there was nothing²which is what is 
called for²does run the risk of being treated as if a matter of imagining 
nothing, and that is refraining from imagining anything. Either that, or, 
I suggest, it is to imagine things lacking where there might have been 
something: we suppose we can imagine the stars ceasing to exist one by 
one²like so many lights going out²but we still look to where they 
were... We have not discarded the setting; something we might search 
in vain, but something²a previously occupied region²none the less. 
(2004: 110-1) 
 
5XQGOH¶VDUJXPHQWLVYDOLGRQO\LIDJDLQLQFRQFHLYDELOLW\HQWDLOVLPSRVVLELOLW\DQGLQ
which case, it would seem, possibility is constituted by conceivability, a single-
criterion Modal Theory. This assumption goes unarticulated and so undefended. So, 
RQHZD\RIDWWDFNLQJ5XQGOH¶VDUJXPHQWUDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\GHQ\LQJWKDWWKHUHLVDQ\
connection whatsoever between conceivability and possibility is to maintain that, 
while conceivability gives one way for a proposition to be possible, there are others as 
well. So, it being inconceivable that p does not rule out the possibility of <p>. Now, 
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LW¶VOLNHO\WKDW5XQGOHZLOOUHVLVWWKLVOLQHRIDUJXPHQWJLYHQWKDWKHWDNHVWKHVRXUFHRI
necessity to be relations between concepts (2004: 98, see also p. 109), which then 
gives rise to a single-criterion Modal Theory. However, for the objection to 
metaphysical nihilism to be cogent, Rundle needs to argue that this is the only source 
of modality.13 
  
A second example of this unarticulated and so undefended assumption can be found in 
*UDKDP2SS\¶V UHFHQW DUJXPHQW DJDLQVW WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIQRWKLQJ He describes his 
µIDYRXULWHWKHRU\RIPRGDOLW\¶WKXV 
 
Wherever there was objective chance, there were alternative 
possibilities. Wherever there is objective chance, there are alternative 
possibilities. Wherever there will be objective chance, there will be 
alternative possibilities. Possible worlds are alternative ways that the 
actual world could have gone, or could go, or could one day go; 
SRVVLEOHZRUOGVDOOµVKDUH¶DQLQLWLDOKLVWRU\ZLWKWKHDFWXDOZRUOGDQG
µEUDQFK¶ IURP WKH DFWXDOZRUOGRQO\ DV D UHVXOW RI WKHRXWZRUNLQJVRI
objective chance. Since the laws that govern the evolution of possible 
worlds do not vary over the course of that evolution, all possible worlds 
µVKDUH¶WKHVDPHODZV ,I WKHUHZDVDQLQLWLDOVWDWHRIWKHDFWXDOZRUOG
WKHQDOOSRVVLEOHZRUOGVµVKDUH¶WKDWLQLWLDOVWDWHLIWKHUHZDVQRLQLWLDO
state of the actual worOGWKHQDOOSRVVLEOHZRUOGVµVKDUH¶VRPHµLQILQLWH¶
initial segment with the actual world, and hence any two possible 
ZRUOGVµVKDUH¶VRPHµLQILQLWH¶LQLWLDOVHJPHQWZLWKRQHDQRWKHU  
 
My favourite theory of modality does not assume that there are 
objective chances. However, if there are no objective chances then, on 
my favourite theory, there is just one possible world: the actual world. 
(this volume: 1) 
 
Notice that Oppy begins with a sufficient cULWHULRQIRUDSURSRVWLRQ¶VEHLQJSRVVLEOH
namely, if there was, is, or will be an objective chance that p then <p> is possible. 
+RZHYHU DIWHU WDNLQJ SRVVLEOH ZRUOGV WR EH µDOWHUQDWLYH ZD\V WKDW WKH DFWXDO ZRUOG
could have gone, or could go, or could one GD\JR¶KHWKHQFRQFOXGHVWKDWDOOSRVVLEOH
ZRUOGVµ³VKDUH´DQLQLWLDOKLVWRU\ZLWKWKHDFWXDOZRUOGDQG³EUDQFK´IURPWKHDFWXDO
ZRUOGRQO\DVDUHVXOWRIWKHRXWZRUNLQJVRIREMHFWLYHFKDQFH¶ This inference is valid 
only if there being an objective chance that p is not only a sufficient but also a 
necessary condition for <p!¶V EHLQJ SRVVLEOH WKDW LV WKDW WKHUH EHLQJ DQ REMHFWLYH
                                                        
13
 In fairness, we should note that Rundle does indirectly address this issue by arguing that 
the possibilities not licensed by his single criterion are meaningless (e.g. 2004: 112-3). This 
requires him to regard many modal intuitions are mere illusions of meaningfulness. Whether 
this move is the same sort of cost of Conservativeness to a theory as denying the intuitions is 
a difficult point to adjudicate, but we expect most readers of this volume to be reluctant to 
accept that they are speaking as much nonsense as Rundle claims. 
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chance that p is a single-criterion theory of modality. This assumption can be seen to 
be at work most dramatically in the last sentence of the passage where he draws the 
consequence that if there are no objective chances, then there is only one possible 
world, the actual world. )ROORZLQJ WKLV RXWOLQH RI KLV µIDYRXULWH PRGDO WKHRU\¶ KH
outlines what he takes to be its controversial consequences, which, again, follow only 
if the Modal Theory he is offering is a single-criterion Modal Theory: 
 
Of course, my favourite theory of modality is controversial: there are 
many who suppose that it omits further possibilities. For example: (a) 
some suppose that there might not have been anything at all; (b) some 
suppose that the initial state of the world²or the entire beginningless 
history of the world²might have been different; (c) some suppose 
that the laws might have been different; (d) some suppose that the 
laws might change as the state of the world evolves; and perhaps 
there are yet other suppositions that might also be entertained. On my 
favourite theory, these alternative suppositions are purely doxastic or 
epistemic: while they are ways that it might be supposed that the 
world could have gone, or could go, or could one day go, they are not 
ways that the world could have gone, or could go, or could one day 
go. (this volume: 2; emphasis in the original) 
 
In what follows, we will challenge this assumption that Modal Theory should be 
single-criterion and thereby challenge these arguments from Rundle and Oppy, not by 
denying that it being conceivable that p or that there being an objective chance that p 
are sufficient criteria for <p!¶VEHLQJSRVVLEOHEXWUDWKHUIRUWKHLUEHLQJQHFHVVDU\IRU
<p!¶V EHLQJ SRVVLEOH RSHQLQJ XS VSDFH LQ WKH GLDOHFWLF IRU PXOWLSOH-criteria modal 
theories. 
 
3. Modal Pluralism 
 
There is always going to be a trade between simplicity and fit to the data in 
constructing any theory, and there is plenty of evidence that single-criterion theories of 
what is possible, while simpler than multiple-criterion theories, always lose too much 
of the data. For example, while we might accept that if p is conceivable, then ¸p, to 
make this the only criterion of possibility amounts to adding the much more 
controversial claim that if p is inconceivable, then ~¸p. This claim faces a dilemma. 
On the first horn, if conceivability is relative to an actual historical circumstance, that 
is, is what actual people in an actual context have the ability to conceive when they try, 
then possibility also becomes so relativized. Consequently, we would find ourselves 
saying that what used to be impossible is now possible and what is now impossible is 
SRVVLEO\« possible (because we can conceive of beings who can conceive of beings 
ZKR« who can conceive of it). There is a debate to be had here, but for many this is 
too big a conflict with intuition. On the second horn, we consider conceivability under 
some idealization, so that what is conceivable for us is thereby ideal-conceivable for 
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previous geneUDWLRQV DQG ZKDW LV FRQFHLYDEO\« conceivable for us is ideal-
conceivable. But then the theory has been modified to: 
 
¸p iff ¸(conceivable that p). 
 
1RZ ZKLOH D SOXUDOLVW WKHRU\ FDQ UHDGLO\ DOORZ FODLPV RI WKH IRUP µ¸p then ¸q¶ D
single-criterion theory cannot have this form. For if it did, it would fail to be a theory 
of the data, the modal intuitions, since all it would allow us to do would be to deduce 
new modal claims from old, without providing any explanation of the original 
intuitions.  
  
We find similar sorts of difficulty with other candidates for single-criterion theories. 
Take, for example, the Principle of Recombination (Lewis, 1986: 87) which is often 
treated as if was a single-criterion theory. In our formulation, this is (2008: 489, 
original numbering preserved): 
 
(7) For any sequence of intrinsically distinct objects x1, x2, x3«
xm and any sequence of cardinals (ni t 0) n1, n2, n3«nm and 
any spatiotemporal relation between those objects, there exists 
a possible world which contains: exactly n1 duplicates of x1, 
exactly n2 duplicates of x2, exactly n3 duplicates of x3 «
exactly nm duplicates of xm in that spatiotemporal relation. 
 
To make this fit the form of a single-FULWHULRQ0RGDO7KHRU\OHW¶VGHILQHD35-world 
as a possible world the existence of which is a consequence of (7). Then the single-
criterion Modal Theory becomes: 
 
(PR)  ¸p iff there is a PR-world at which p is true. 
 
Now this theory does really well in establishing possibilities, such as there being more 
or fewer of certain kinds of object or for objects to have existed in different places and 
times. But it is far less clear how it can establish that talking donkeys are possible. 
Presumably, if talking donkeys are possible, there is some re-configuration of matter, 
specifically donkey cells, probably with additional neurons and also muscles around 
the throat and tongue, which is sufficient for there to be a talking donkey. (Setting 
aside, for present purposes, the question of whether there is some PR-world in which a 
donkey talks in virtue of the transmigration of a human soul into a donkey body.) And 
the Principle of Recombination tells us that there is a PR-world with that re-
configuration of matter. But it does not tell us that talking donkeys are possible 
because it does not tell us that that re-configuration of matter is sufficient for there to 
be a talking donkey. So (PR) does not determine whether it is possible that there are 
talking donkeys. 
  
 15 
Assuming for a moment that, even on reflection, we do have the intuition that there 
might be talking donkeys, then (PR) fails to fit the data in this respect. It also fails to 
fit the data in respect of any other intuition we might have that ¸p, where p is not a fact 
about the distribution of objects but one which supervenes upon it. This has the 
consequence that if (PR) were the correct single-criterion Modal Theory, certain vexed 
debates in philosophy would be quickly resolved. For example, it would become a 
mere triviality that zombies are possible. To avoid this consequence and fit the data 
rather better, (PR) QHHGV WR EH VXSSOHPHQWHG E\ µFRQQHFWLQJ D[LRPV¶ /HZLV  
155) telling us which supervenient facts hold at which PR-worlds. These connecting 
axioms will be strict conditionals, but for Modal Theory, what is important is not the 
strict conditional but tKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHIRUPµLI¸p then ¸q¶ZKHUHp is entailed 
by the existence of a PR-world and q is some supervenient fact. Which is to say, either 
(PR) fails to fit the data, or it needs to be supplemented with some further Principles of 
Modal Theory. 
  
We have no general proof that a single-criterion theory which fits the data well can be 
constructed, but it should be clear that the burden of proof is on the one who proposes 
just a single criterion. Those of us who allow multiple criteria will always have a 
better fit to the data because we can take any proposed single criterion and add a 
further criterion to improve the fit. But that might be thought to be a cost in terms of 
simplicity which needs to be weighed in the balance. 
  
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the dialectical position with respect to 
those partisans of desert landscapes who think that who think that a poor fit with the 
data of modal intuition is not a cost to Modal Theory but rather a benefit, for 
possibility is intrinsically suspect and should only be allowed in the most limited of 
cases.14 From the point of view of Methodological Separatism, what is going on here 
is that a weak Modal Theory²µZHDN¶ LQ WKH VHQVH RI QRW GRLQJ D JRRG MRE RI
theorizing the data²is being preferred over much stronger alternatives on the basis of 
consistency with independent metaphysical views. While that is a perfectly legitimate 
move to make, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is a significant cost has been 
incurred when we are scorekeeping in the metaphysical game. 
  
So far, we have drawn attention to the fact that many modal theorists seem to assume 
that Modal Theory is single-criterion, and we then argued inconclusively in favour of a 
multiple-criteria Modal Theory. We now consider one alleged advantage of a single-
criterion theory, namely, that it does a better job of capturing our intuitions about 
necessity since we can infer impossibility from the failure of that single-criterion. The 
obvious way for multiple-criterion theories to capture intuitions about necessity is to 
write them in as separate Principles, but that really does look ad hoc compared to the 
                                                        
14
 Oppy (this volume) seems to be an example of this attitude since he is happy to discard all 
intuitions that there are possibilities with different histories in return for reducing all 
possibility to objective chance. 
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single-criterion approach. Another response would be to deny that Modal Theory must 
in fact capture a set of intuitions about necessity as well as about possibility. We 
explore this response by considering cases. The best candidates for intuitions about 
necessity are intuitions about essence. For example, how should Modal Theory capture 
the various principles of the necessity of origin, such as that I must have had the 
parents I did or that this table must have been made from the wood it was made from? 
These appear to have the form: 
 
(NO)  (x) (Ox o Ox) 
 
Are these Principles of Modal Theory reached by systematizing our modal intuitions? 
Many philosophers assert that they are (e.g. Ballarin 2011: n. 2). However, on the face 
of it, we have a contrary intuition. Consider this table, made from the oak which blew 
GRZQLQWKH*UHDW6WRUPRI¶ The intuition is widely shared that it could turn out 
that this table here was not in fact made from that oak, that the carpenter had made a 
mistake and used the wrong wood. Surely then this is the intuition that it is possible 
that this very table had a different origin? 
  
The defender of the necessity of origin will claim that the possibility just described in 
which we discover the table had a different origin from the one we believed it had is 
distinct from the possibility that it has a different origin from the one it actually has. Is 
it a modal intuition, a pre-philosophical datum that Modal Theory must try to fit, that 
this is not possible, that given the table was made from that tree it could not have been 
made from another? .ULSNH WHOOV XV WKDW LW µVHHPV VR¶ WRKLPEXW DOVR WKDW µLQPany 
FDVHV \RXZRQ¶WEHFRPHFRQYLQFHGRI WKLV DW OHDVWQRWDW WKHPRPHQW¶ 1980: 113), 
suggesting that it takes some reflection to share the intuition. Can reflection which 
does not appeal to philosophical theories persuade us? Here is how that reflection 
might go (drawing on Kripke 1980: 114, n. 56): it is possible that as well as this table, 
PDGHIURPWKHRDNZKLFKIHOO LQ WKHVWRUPRI¶ WKHUHLVDQRWKHUYHU\VLPLODUWDEOH
made at roughly the same time from a different oak, perhaps one felled deliberately in 
the week before the storm. Since there are two tables in this possibility, the latter is 
obviously not identical to the former. But then there is a third possibility in which the 
former is not made but the latter is. It would still not be identical with our original 
table, and since the choice of alternative origin was arbitrary, this shows that any 
possible table with a different origin is not identical with the table made from the oak 
ZKLFKIHOOLQWKH*UHDW6WRUPRI¶ 
  
Kripke himself tells us that this argument rests on the necessity of distinctness, but as 
decades of attempts to reconstruct the argument have shown, it must rest upon more 
than just that. A different line of reflection is offered by Dummett (1973: 130-1), who 
suggests that the necessity of origin follows from the thought that an essential property 
RIDQREMHFWLVRQHZKLFKDWHYHU\WLPHGXULQJLWVH[LVWHQFHLWFDQQRWµFHDVHWRKDYH¶ 
&OHDUO\WKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIVRPHWKLQJ¶VFRPLQJLQWRH[LVWHQFH fulfil this condition. 
But, apart form the fact that this makes way too much essential (McGinn 1976: 130), 
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this only establishes the necessity of origin if it is not possible for one thing to have 
different essential properties²on this definition of essence²in different possible 
worlds. And clearly the world in which the table was made from a different tree is an 
apparent counter-example to that claim. So no progress is made. 
 
Perhaps we do not need an argument here at all, perhaps there is a modal intuition 
about naming which will rule out the possibility that this table could have had a 
different origin? ,QWKHODVWSDUDJUDSKZHWRRNFDUHQRWWRQDPHWKHWDEOHEXW.ULSNH¶V
discussion, and all that follow it, always introduce a name for the original table. So let 
us call the table actually made from the wood of the oak that fell during the Great 
6WRUPRI¶µ7DEE\¶DQGPDNHFOHDU WKDW WKLV LVDJHQXLQHVLQJXODU WHUPDQGQRWDQ
abbreviated description. Now, consider the possible world in which no table is made 
from that tree but a very similar table is made from another tree. Is that table Tabby? 
One way of addressing that question is to ask about the name, that is, does the name 
µ7DEE\¶DVZHXVHLWUHIHUWRWKDWWDEOHLQWKDWSRVVLEOHZRUOG" (Of course, the people 
LQWKDWZRUOGPD\KDYHWKHLURZQQDPHIRUWKHWDEOHDQGWKDWPD\DOVREHµ7DEE\¶EXW
it is our name we are asking about.)  
  
This question about naming could surely only receive an intuitive answer if semantic 
competence with the name involved grasping some principles of the form: (x) (Fx o 
µ7¶UHIHUVWRx). Now Kripke of all people is not going to appeal to semantic intuitions 
DERXWQDPLQJRIWKDWIRUP,WVHHPVLQVWHDGWKDWZKDWLVGULYLQJ.ULSNH¶VLQWXLWLRQLV
that there are constraints upon which possible objects a given actual name can refer to, 
that these constraints are not part of the intension or connotation or sense of the name, 
but rather they must derive from some contingent causal connection between the name 
and the object. 7KXVVLQFHRXUQDPHµ7DEE\¶RQO\UHIHUVWRDSDUWLFXODUWDEOHLQYLUWXH
RI WKDW WDEOH¶V FDXVDO UHODWLRQV IRU LW WR UHIHU WR D SRVVLEOH WDEOH What possible table 
must have the right position in the causal order to be the referent of our name. It could 
then be argued (not easily, but one can see how the argument might proceed by ruling 
out alternatives) that only having the same origin as Tabby is sufficient to make it the 
FDVH WKDW WKH QDPH µ7DEE\¶ UHIHUV WR WKDW REMHFW15 ,I WKLV LV ZKDW XQGHUOLHV .ULSNH¶V
FRQYLFWLRQ WKDW D WDEOH ZLWK D GLIIHUHQW RULJLQ ZRXOG QRW EH µWKLV WDEOH¶ (1980: 113; 
emphasis in the original), that is, would not be Tabby, then we can see that far from 
the necessity of origin being a modal datum, the modal intuition that Tabby could have 
been made from a different tree is over-ruled by the theoretical requirement that there 
EHDGHWHUPLQDWHIDFWDVWRZKHWKHURXUQDPHµ7DEE\¶UHIHUVWRDJLYHQPHUHO\SRVVLEOH
table or not.16 
  
                                                        
15
 This is a metDOLQJXLVWLFYHUVLRQRI6DOPRQ¶VSUHPLVH9 
16
 Some may think that there is an intuition that it is determinate whether our name refers to 
any actual object or not. This might become a requirement that it be equally determinate 
whether it refers to any possible object or not via the necessity of identity. But it is not clear 
that the necessity of identity is a modal intuition either. 
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The necessity of identity may have greater claim to be a modal intuition. However, 
when we examine this debate more closely, this is again not so obvious. For it seems 
WKDWERWKVLGHVDJUHHWKDWZHKDYHWKHLQWXLWLRQWKDWWKHOXPSRIEURQ]HµLV¶WKHVWDWXH
and that it might not have been the statue (had it not been poured into the mold). 
Proponents of contingent identity claim that these intuitions are about the identity and 
thus their view conserves the data, whereas proponents of the necessity of identity 
claim that these intuitions are not about the identity of the bronze and the statue but 
some other relation such as constitution. So again we have a situation in which the 
intuitive data apparently conflicts with the essentialist claim and has to be re-
interpreted. When re-interpreted it does not support essentialism, but merely fails to 
conflict with it. The support for essentialism comes from a process of reflection which, 
typically, appeals to the necessity of self-LGHQWLW\ DQG /HLEQL]¶V /DZ DSSOLHG WR
modalized open sentences. However, this process of reflection is not one which 
produces general, let alone universal, agreement, so does not look to be a good 
candidate for a modal intuition. Perhaps the necessity of self-identity will have to be 
an axiomatic Principle of Modal Theory, but that is hardly a great cost to simplicity. 
However, we might think that if, among the multiple modal Principles, there is to be 
one introducing necessities, it is most likely to be a version of the Rule of 
Necessitation: if p is known a priori17 then p. This would explain the necessity of 
self-identity (we know the self-identity of each thing a priori) and analytic or 
FRQFHSWXDOWUXWKVVXFKDVµ$OOYL[HQVDUHIR[HV¶DQGµ1RWKLQJLVUHGDQGJUHHQDOORYHU
DWWKHVDPHWLPH¶ And of course, within a multiple-criterion Modal Theory, accepting 
this Principle does not rule out a posteriori necessities. 
  
The objection was that we always have a reason to prefer a single-criterion Modal 
Theory because it directly entails intuitions of necessity whereas a multiple-criterion 
theory will have to capture those intuitions by adding ad hoc Principles. But we have 
seen that the alleged intuitions of necessity are either no such thing or can be captured 
E\WKHVLQJOH3ULQFLSOHµLILWp is known a priori, then p¶ 
  
So we have seen that single-criterion theories will always have trouble providing an 
adequate fit to the data and that there is no such problem with multiple-criterion 
theories. Of course, there is always a trade between simplicity and fit, but we are left 
with no reason to think that only a single-criterion theory can find the appropriate 
balance. Thus the widespread, unargued assumption that an adequate Modal Theory 
will be single-criterion is unjustified. 
 
4. Burdens of Proof and Metaphysical Nihilism Again 
 
                                                        
17
 Being a priori is analogous to being a theorem because a theorem rests on no assumptions 
and what is known a priori depends upon no evidence. Note that it is important that p be 
known a priori: a priori warrants are defeasible, so we may have a priori warrant for some 
beliefs without knowing them (e.g. Flockemann 2011) and even without their being true.  
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If a multiple-criterion Modal Theory consists of a collection of Principles of the form 
µLIp then ¸q¶DQGWKH3ULQFLSOHµLIp is known a priori then p¶WKHQRXUNQRZOHGJH
of the range of possibilities becomes, in a sense, open-ended. For in order to establish 
~¸p, one would either have to know ~p a priori (and we are right to think that the 
scope of genuine a priori knowledge is probably quite narrow) or to know that some 
specific set of Principles are all the Principles of Modal Theory and deduce ~¸p from 
the failure of this complete Modal Theory to entail ¸p. However, once we accept the 
need for a multiplicity of criteria of possibility, it seems epistemically risky to make 
WKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWRQH¶V0RGDOTheory is complete, since there is always the chance 
that some first-order axiom has been missed. Thus, for a given possibility not entailed 
by the (first-order) axioms, it is usually an epistemically open question as to whether 
that possibility is a genuine possibility or not.  
 
1RZ LI WKH H[WHQW RI SRVVLELOLW\ LV RSHQ HQGHG LQ WKLV ZD\ +XPH¶V 5D]RU Ds 
formulated by Peter Forrest (2001; cf. Efird & Stoneham 2005),  
 
(HR) Do not multiply necessities beyond necessity. 
 
then follows. For in positing a necessary truth, the philosopher is taking a risk, since 
for all they know, they have missed out an axiom of their corresponding Modal Theory 
which entails the possibility ruled out by the necessity they posited. Similarly, what 
PLJKWEHWHUPHGµ/HLEQL]¶V3ULQFLSOHRIWKH3UHVXPSWLRQRI3RVVLELOLW\¶18 
 
(LP) One has the right to assume ¸p until someone proves the contrary. 
  
is also a good regulative principle in philosophy, since proving impossibility requires 
proving one has not over-looked some Principle which generates possibilities, and that 
is harder than proving the acceptability of some proposed Principle. In general, where 
theoretical certainty is lacking, pragmatic considerations can come in to judgement-
making.  
  
John Heil (this volume: 5), following C.B. Martin (2008: 65) disagrees. He formulates 
the following principle: 
 
(C) It is no good assuming that p is contingent in cases in which p¶VEHLQJ
contingent functions as a substantive premise in an argument. 
                                                        
18
 Leibniz (1703-5/1982: 438) writes, 
 
And it is already something that by this remark it is proved that given that God is 
possible, he exists, which is the privilege of Divinity alone. One has the right to 
presume the possibility of every Being, and above all that of God, until someone 
proves the contrary. So that this metaphysical argument already yields a moral 
demonstrative conclusion, which implies in the present state of our knowledge we 
ought to judge that God exists, and act accordingly.  
 20 
 
$QGFRPPHQWVµ:KHUHp is a substantive thesis that serves as a premise, the claim that 
p is contingent and the claim that p is not contingent DUHRQDOOIRXUV¶WKLVYROXPH 6). 
In a footnote to this remark (n. 5), he writes,  
 
5R\6RUHQVHQKDVUHPLQGHGPHWKDW0DUWLQ¶VSULQFLSOHLWVHOILQFOXGHV
D VXEVWDQWLYH FRPPLWPHQW WR µPRGDO IDOOLELOLVP¶ 7KH SULQFLSOH
assumes that modal truths have mind-independent truthmakers 
concerning which we could be wrong. I do not know how to discuss 
the issue at hand²the why-is-there-anything question²without 
making this assumption.  
 
Now, it is ironic that MartLQ¶VDQG+HLO¶VSRVLWLRQLVGHSHQGHQWXSRQDIRUPRIPRGDO
fallibilism since it is also a form of modal fallibilism that is motivating our position, a 
position which supports the regulative (LP). For on our modal fallibilism, since we 
could have missed out RQHRIWKHD[LRPVRI0RGDO7KHRU\RIWKHIRUPµLIp then ¸q¶
it is safest to assume that those we do have are not all that there are, and so 
possibilities are, in general, never ruled out but rather ruled in; consequently, it is then 
safest to presume a putative possibility genuinely possible unless we have positive 
reason to rule it out, which is just (LP). 
  
Finally, it seems that not only does a multiple-criteria Modal Theory consisting of 
D[LRPV RI WKH IRUP µLI p then ¸q¶ VXSSRUW QRW RQO\ +XPH¶V 5D]RU DQG /HLEQL]¶V
Principle of the Presumption of Possibility, two popular and deeply held 
methodological principles, it also seems to leave open the epistemic possibility of 
impossible worlds. For, the modalized Principle of Non-contradiction 
 
(NC) ~¸(p & ~p) 
 
is not one of the axioms of Modal TheoryVLQFHLWLVQRWRIWKHIRUPµLIp then ¸q¶19 It 
is then an open question whether it could be rational to assert the possibility of a 
contradiction.20  
                                                        
19
 It might be a theorem if ~(p & ~p) is known a priori. But the dialetheist takes the Liar and 
related paradoxes to cast doubt on precisely that.  
20
 One way of resolving this question is by considering the philosophical theory of propositional 
attitudes. Hintikka (1975: 475) puts the following claim forward:  
 
$ VHQWHQFH RI WKH IRUP µa knows that p¶ LV WUXH LQ D ZRUOG W iff p is true in all 
epistemic a-alternatives to W, i.e., in all the epistemically possible worlds which are 
compatible with everything a knows in W.  
 
Now, this claim is not, strictly speaking, a part of Modal Theory, in the sense of the theorization of the 
pre-philosophical modal data. However, it does generate possibilities: if a does not know that p, then 
there is an epistemically possible world in which p is false. Furthermore, with some plausible 
assumptions, as Hintikka notes, it generates logically impossible worlds. 
 21 
  
This way of understanding the theory of possibility fits very well with a framework 
introduced by Nathan Salmon (1989). Salmon distinguishes ways for the things to be 
from ways things might have been (1989: FDOOLQJWKHIRUPHUµJHQHULFZRUOGV¶DQG
WKHODWWHUµSRVVLEOHZRUOGV¶ Now the possible worlds are clearly a subset of the generic 
worlds, though they may not be a proper subset. Salmon is primarily concerned to 
argue against the S4 axiom p o p on the basis of examples where it is 
impossible that a given table T might have been made out of a certain block of wood w, 
even though it is possibly possible that it might. Thus, the world in which T is made 
from w is impossible relative to the actual world but possible relative to some other 
world. In order for this to make sense, we need a notion of worlds, the generic worlds, 
which is independent of the question of whether any given world is possible or not. 
$QGRQFHZHKDYHWKLVLQSODFHZHFDQDOORZWKDWµ6RPHZD\VIRUWKLQJVWREH are not 
even possibly possibly«SRVVLEOHIRUDQ\GHJUHHRI QHVWLQJ>«@$VIDUDV,FDQWHOO
worlds need not even be logically consiVWHQW¶ 7-8). 
  
There is no need for us to take a view here on which generic worlds, if any, may not be 
possible worlds. However, we should accept the metaphysically neutral translation 
schemata: 
 
If (p  ~p) then there is a generic world at which p; 
If ¸p then there is a possible world at which p. 
 
Rather, the distinction between generic and possible worlds allows us to understand 
the role of Modal Theory in the debate about whether there might have been nothing. 
For what a Modal Theory does is say of a generic world, whatever that might be, that 
it is a possible world, of a way for things to be that it is a way things might have been. 
Now, there being nothing concrete is a way for things to be (pace Rundle): the empty 
world is a generic world. What an argument for metaphysical nihilism has to do is to 
give a principle of Modal Theory on which that way for things to be is a way they 
might have been. The Subtraction Argument as we reconstruct it (2005a) does 
precisely this by formulating and justifying the principle of subtractability. Similarly, 
we noted (2008) that one plausible formulation of the Principle of Recombination also 
entails that the empty world is possible. Thus, there are two candidate reasons to 
accept metaphysical nihilism, and we can endorse both. 
  
All this goes to show that the burden of proof in the debate lies with one who denies 
that the empty world is a possible world. They must either offer an argument that 
regarding it as possible conflicts with some other piece of metaphysics (e.g. Lowe (this 
volume)) and opt to reject the best Modal Theory in favour of one which does not have 
the plausible principles which entail metaphysical nihilism, or they must offer an 
alternative Modal Theory and argue that it is a better theory of our modal intuitions. 
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